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We sometimes use multiple names for the same 
person or thing without realizing it. 
Imagine an ancient astronomer sees a heavenly body 
in the evening and names it ‘Hesperus.’ They also see 
a heavenly body in the morning and name it 
‘Phosphorus.’ What they do not realize, however, is 
that they have named the same planet twice over, the 
planet that we now know as Venus. 
Similarly, in the Superman comics, Lois Lane doesn’t 
doesn’t realize that the person she knows as 
‘Superman’ is the same as the person she knows as 
‘Clark Kent.’ Also, many people don’t know that Mark 
Twain is Samuel Clemens. 
These scenarios all raise a puzzle that is pivotal to 
our understanding of meaning and thought—two 
central notions in the philosophy of language and 
mind. It is called Frege’s puzzle, after the philosopher 
and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). This 
essay will introduce the puzzle and outline Frege’s 
solution. 
1. Reference 
At its core, the puzzle is concerned with the meaning 
of words. To return to our earlier example, do the 
words ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ mean the same 
thing? Or are their meanings different? 
At first glance, it would appear that the meaning of a 
name is its referent—that is, the meaning of a name is 
the object that it names. This a compelling account of 
meaning because the function of a name is to pick out 
an object. 
When I say that ‘Hesperus appears at night,’ the name 
‘Hesperus’ serves to indicate that I am speaking about 
Hesperus. Moreover, what I have said is true or false 
depending on whether Hesperus (the planet itself) 
appears at night.[1] If that’s right, then the meaning of 
‘Hesperus’ just is Hesperus. The planet itself serves as 
the meaning. 
2. Frege’s puzzle 
However, when we consider the case of our 
imaginary astronomer, it appears that the meaning of 
a name isn’t just its referent. 
If the meaning of a name were just its referent, then 
‘Hesperus’ would have the same meaning as 
‘Phosphorus’ (since they refer to the same object). 
And ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would mean the same 
thing as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus.’ 
But that doesn’t sound right; these sentences appear 
to have different meanings to our astronomer. The 
astronomer can understand both sentences perfectly 
well, but they may accept one and reject the other. 
Furthermore, if thoughts correspond to meanings 
that are determined by reference, then the thought 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus would be the same as the 
thought that Hesperus is Hesperus. 
But that seems incorrect: ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is 
trivial, whereas ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ appears to 
express new information, with the significance of an 
empirical discovery. The two thus differ in what 
Frege calls cognitive significance and this suggests 
that they express different thoughts. 
Thus, Frege’s puzzle: we have reasons both for and 
against identifying the meaning of a name with its 
referent.[2] 
3. Sense 
In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege proposes to solve 
the problem by proposing that there is not just one, 
but two kinds of meaning. 
The first kind of meaning is reference. The second 
kind of meaning is called ‘sense.’ 
Frege’s idea is that, although ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ share the same referent, they express 
different senses (same for ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark 
Kent,’ ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ and the 
like). 
When Frege hypothesizes the existence of senses, he 
defines them primarily by the roles that they are 
supposed to perform. Accordingly, the sense of an 





1. senses are a kind of meaning for linguistic 
expressions. Specifically, they are supposed to 
explain: 
• synonymy (expressions are synonymous 
when they share the same sense); 
• linguistic understanding (to understand an 
expression is to grasp its sense); 
• the publicity of language (speakers share a 
common language when they associate it with 
the same senses).[4] 
As a result, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ will not be 
synonyms because they express different senses; 
2. senses are supposed to explain differences 
in cognitive significance: e.g.,‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is 
trivial while ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is 
informative because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
possess different senses; 
3. the sense of a name is supposed to determine its 
referent, not the other way around. Expressions with 
different senses can share the same referent (e.g. 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’), but expressions with 
the same sense must thereby share the same 
referent;[5] and: 
4. senses are the constituents of thought. This 
explains why the thought that Hesperus is a 
planet appears to be distinct from the thought 
that Phosphorus is a planet; these thoughts really 
are distinct because they are composed of different 
senses.[6] 
This definition still leaves it open as to what else 
senses might be. 
Frege also says that senses are ‘modes of 
presentation’ of the referent.[7] When the astronomer 
introduced the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ 
they were presented with the referent (Venus) in 
different ways in different circumstances, and this is 
supposed to determine a difference in sense for these 
words. 
However, it must be admitted that the idea of a ‘mode 
of presentation’ is obscure.[8] In subsequent years, 
other philosophers have given more refined 
proposals for interpreting Fregean sense—that is, for 
identifying a kind of meaning that fulfills roles 1 – 4.[9] 
4. Conclusion 
Frege’s puzzle can arise whenever there are multiple 
words that represent the same thing, which is a 
common feature of language. These cases suggest 
that there is more to meaning than reference—that 
we need a second concept, sense, to understand the 
meaning of words. 
Although Frege’s solution is compelling, it is not 
without controversy. Many philosophers have 
challenged Frege’s concept of sense by arguing that 
no one thing can play all of the four roles that are 
required of sense; others argue that some of these 
roles need not be included in the definition of 
meaning.[10] So it remains debatable whether Frege 
succeeded in defining a kind of meaning apart from 
reference. 
Nevertheless, Frege’s puzzle continues to inspire 
philosophical thinking about meaning and thought. 
Notes 
[1] There is another (more theoretical) reason for 
holding that the meaning of a name is its referent. 
In brief, the systematic theories of meaning that have 
been developed in logic and linguistics typically 
assume that the meaning of a name is its referent. 
Moreover, by making this assumption, these theories 
are able to explain an important feature of meaning: 
specifically, how the meanings of complex sentences 
depend on the meanings of their simplest parts. 
(They can explain, for example, how the meaning of 
‘Hesperus appears at night’ depends on the meaning 
of ‘Hesperus.’). 
Frege himself developed such an account in other 
areas of his work, in his Grundgesetze der 
Arithmetik (1893). Since it is possible to explain this 
fact about meaning by assuming that meaning is 
reference, we thus have another motivation for 
holding that meaning is reference. 
[2] Frege’s puzzle reveals an internal tension in how 
we ordinarily think about words’ meaning.On the one 
hand, we sometimes think of meaning as reference: 
when I say ‘Hesperus appears at night,’ I mean to be 
speaking about Hesperus; by ‘Hesperus,’ 
I mean Venus, the second planet from the sun. But on 
the other hand, we sometimes do not naturally think 
of meaning as reference: it seems wrong to say that 
for Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent’ has the same meaning as 
‘Superman.’ 
[3] In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege appears to 
have a fifth role in mind: sense is also supposed to 
explain the significance of names that lack referents 
(e.g. ‘Vulcan’ is meaningful because it has a sense, 
despite lacking a referent). See Frege (1948 [1892]), 




Evans) argue that this role is inessential to the 
central insight. 
[4] Ibid., 210-212. 
[5] Ibid., 211. In his (1948 [1892]), Frege does not tell 
us how the sense of a term determines its referent. 
However, we can see how this might work if, e.g., we 
assume what is called the ‘descriptivist’ 
interpretation of Fregean sense, which holds that the 
sense of a name is a description of the referent. So, 
e.g., the sense of ‘Hesperus’ would be a description, 
perhaps ‘the celestial body that appears at such-and-
such location in the evening.’ The referent of the term 
would then be determined as the unique thing that 
satisfies this description. 
[6] For Frege, this is a thesis about thoughts 
themself and a thesis about the meanings of the 
sentences that report beliefs (and other kinds of 
thoughts). 
According to the first part of the thesis, the senses of 
simple expressions compose into the senses of 
sentences. For example, the sense of the name 
‘Hesperus’ will compose with the sense of ‘is a planet’ 
to yield the sense of ‘Hesperus is a 
planet.’ Furthermore, according to this picture, the 
sense of ‘Hesperus is a planet’ is the same thing 
as what is thought by someone who thinks 
that Hesperus is a planet. In short: the senses of 
sentences are the contents of thought. 
As for the second part of this thesis, Frege claims that 
when a name like ‘Hesperus’ appears within a report 
of a belief, such as ‘The astronomer believed that 
Hesperus is a star’, it refers to its usual sense, rather 
than to Hesperus itself. This is called the theory of 
indirect reference. See ibid., 218-220. 
[7] Ibid., 211. 
[8] In “The Thought,” Frege proposes that senses are 
abstract objects that exist in a realm that is 
independent of both the material and psychological 
realm. According to Frege, senses cannot be 
subjective ideas in the minds of individuals because 
meanings are essentially public (as per role 1). In 
order for speakers to communicate with each other, 
they must each associate the same senses with the 
same words. See Frege (1956), 308. 
This idea of Frege’s turned out to be influential for 
subsequent thinking about propositions. Many 
philosophers, following Frege, have held that the 
meanings of sentences are a kind of abstract object, 
called propositions, that are composed of the 
meanings of words. These propositions are supposed 
to be entertainable in thought and capable of truth or 
falsity. Sentences from different languages—e.g. 
‘snow is white’ and ‘la neige est blanche’—can 
express the same proposition. 
[8] Frege gave examples of senses that were 
descriptions and some philosophers have interpreted 
senses as always consisting of descriptions grasped 
by the speaker. On this interpretation, the sense of 
‘Hesperus’ could be given by the description ‘the 
celestial body that appears at such-and-such location 
in the evening.’ 
Other philosophers have interpreted senses as 
conceptual roles, whereby the sense of an expression 
is understood by the patterns in which it is used in 
inferences and reasoning. 
There are other options too. Picking up on the idea 
that the sense of ‘Hesperus’ is a mode of presenting 
Hesperus, Gareth Evans interpreted the sense of a 
name as a way of thinking of or recognizing the 
referent of the name. See Evans (1982), ch. 1. 
[10] There are a number of important works that aim 
to show that no one feature of a word can do all of the 
jobs that sense is supposed to do. The key texts in 
this critical tradition are Saul Kripke’s Naming and 
Necessity and “A puzzle about belief,” and David 
Kaplan “On Demonstratives.” Put very briefly, Kripke 
argues in Naming and Necessity that the referent of a 
name is not generally determined by the speaker’s 
idea of the referent, and so roles 3 and 4 come apart; 
he also argues, in “A puzzle about belief,” that words 
that are synonyms in public language need not have 
the same cognitive significance for individual 
speakers, and so roles 1 and 2 come apart; finally, 
Kaplan argues that we need to make a further 
distinction between two kinds of meaning, which he 
calls character and content, and that Frege’s concept 
of sense is a conflation of the two. 
For an overview of these developments, see the 
chapter “Meaning” in Gillian Russell’s Truth in Virtue 
of Meaning. 
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